UGANDA’S JUDICIARY SPOTLIGHT (5.31.2016)

Judicial branches are crucial supports to well-functioning democracies. Courts reign in the power of the legislative branch by holding it accountable to the constitution, and they act as watchdogs to elected members of the executive branch (presidents, governors, etc. ) whose actions exceed their constitutional authority. An equally important role for judiciaries is that they raise the cost of action by other political actors who act imprudently: deciding to act against the recommendations and decisions by judges ‘outs’ political actors as authoritarians or it contributes to illigitimacy of the political system in which both belong. Attenuating the judicial system in any democracy reduces the checks against the legislature and the executive, but it does so at the expense not only of the judicial branch but of the system as a whole. While judges come from elite groups - graduating as an attorney and then succeeding as an attorney within this subset of college-educated peers - they have also played important roles as bulwarks against authoritarian rule and expansionary executives.

Judicial Caseload

While attacks against judges directly are rare, emaciating a judicial branch of government comes amid ‘austerity’ measures as much as it occurs as a result of culling political opponents. Among the courts struggling to manage their caseload are the Courts of Appeals, which have lost ground year after year in terms of hearing cases. Since 2010, the number of Appeals Justices has increased from 7 to 12 and they have tried more cases, from 386 to 972 respectively (Kavuma 2015: 12). Not only are there more justices, but the justices are becoming more efficient with the cases per justice increasing from ~55 to 81 per year. However, while there are more justices who are hearing more cases per justice, the number of pending cases has effectively doubled since 2010. In 2010, 2634 cases were brought before the Court of Appeal, 846 were filed and 2634 were left pending. In 2015, 4400 were brought before the Court of Appeal, 1706 were filed and 5844 were left pending (Kavuma 2015: 12).    

Works Cited

Kavuma, Steven. Judicial Uganda. 2015. Court of Appeal, Constitutional Court Report. 18th Judges Annual Conference. Kampala, Uganda.

UGANDA’S ELECTIONS (4.3.2016)

      President Museveni will continue his tenure as President of Uganda. His recent electoral success continues a trend of success in a government whose constitution has experienced no other president. While the international community is rightly concerned with this trend, Ugandans themselves hold the president in moderately positive esteem. Research World International conducted a poll between December 10, 2015 and Janurary 17, 2016, surveying over 2,600 registered voters from 89 of Uganda’s 112 districts (http://researchworldint.net/images/downloads/Opinion-Poll-Report-Dec-2015-Jan-2016.pdf). In Research World’s poll, Museveni accrued 51% of the popular vote while FDC candidate Kizza Besigye won 32% and independent candidate Patrick Amama Mbabazi won 12% (http://researchworldint.net/images/downloads/Opinion-Poll-Report-Dec-2015-Jan-2016.pdf).

       In the election itself, Uganda’s Electoral Commission awarded President Museveni the electoral victory with 60.6% of the vote, which is 5,971,872 of the 9,851,812 valid votes cast (http://www.ec.or.ug/?q=2016-general-elections-summary). In total 10,329,131 people cast votes or approximately 67% of registered voters. Museveni’s ~60% vote is an improvement over his 2006 victory but less than his victory in 2011 (59.26% and 68,38% respectively).

      The 2016 election was pocked with systemic electoral failures. Demonstrators took to the streets throughout Kampala in response to polling stations that lacked presidential ballots and in response to the arrest of the Forum for Democratic Change’s presidential candidate Kizza Besigye’s house arrest. One district in Kibuli, an opposition stronghold, did not receive Presidential aspirant Kizza Besigye was placed under house arrest since February 17th (http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Besigye-house-arrest-case-resumes-today/-/688334/3121742/-/hqvuui/-/index.html), and has since released a video describing his detainment. The NRM also hired approximately 100,000 ‘Crime Preventers’ prior to the elections (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/world/africa/top-opposition-candidate-in-uganda-is-arrested-on-election-day.html ), causing observers to worry that the NRM enlisted teams of vigilantees to intimidate and subvert the opposition. US Secretary of State John Kerry responded begrudgingly to the elections in his telephone call to President Museveni. Kerry noted problems at the voting locations, arrest of candidates, and the Uganda government’s move to block social media (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253069.htm) .

      The Supreme Court continues to hear appeals from political opponents challenging the outcome of the election, but it is unlikely that they will overturn February’s results. Instead, if the Supreme Court decides to acknowledge the election irregularities, it will likely report a similar outcome as it reported in 2012. In the previous presidential election, Uganda’s Supreme Court found that though there were sporadic irregularities the results adequately reflected the will of the people and would stand.

UGANDA LAND POLICY (3.22.2016)

Land policy reform remains fundamental to rural economic development. Getting policies ‘right’ to encourage development and investment remains one of the cornerstones of economic development in sub-saharan africa (Deininger and Binswager 1999, Onoma 2010). Where formal land rights provide a protocol for transparency and economic stability, laws do not execute themselves. Indeed, land rights scholars rightly aver that ‘rules are not enough: execution matters’ (Ostrom and Nagenda 2007, Gibb 2013). Inasmuch as legislation and land policy in Uganda is becoming more sophisticated, inclusive, and accessible, the recent presidential elections have shown that there remains strong public outcry against Uganda’s land failures.

2016 Elections Pledges

In the recent presidential elections, each candidate acknowledged the popular demand for land reform. Incumbent President and NRM chairman Yoweri Museveni promised institutional reform and strengthening local-level adjudication mechanisms (http://www.reuters.com/article/uganda-politics-landrights-idUSL8N15E03O).  FDC challenger Kizza Besigye understood Uganda’s land conflict as a struggle for peasant farmers against titled owners and ‘land-grabbers’, at once appealing to landless farmers and rural populists concerned about the status of their tenure (http://www.elections.co.ug/new-vision/election/1415187/besigye-heads-wakiso).  A third presidential contender, independent presidential candidate Joseph Elton Mabirizi, contended that his administration would guarantee land rights and defeat the current elite coalitions which fuel contemporary reforms (http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/Elections/Mabirizi-to-promote-talents--promises-land-reforms/-/859108/3000426/-/p489q1z/-/index.html). Both Besigye and Mabirizi seek greater clarity to the titling process, advocating independent councils and audits http://www.reuters.com/article/uganda-politics-landrights-idUSL8N15E03O) .

Budgeting

Recent national budgets allocate new money to land projects, including funds to digitize land titles. The National Land Registration System, launched in 2014, continues to define Uganda’s titling program via the Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development. The program registered over 5,000 mailo claims and over 1,000 freehold claims, and it also surveyed over 4,600 properties (BTTB 2016: 77). Uganda’s 2015/16 allocates nearly 26 billion (UGX) for the Land and Urban Housing sector in accordance with Uganda’s new National Land Policy (2013), down from the 29 billion UGX approved in the 2013/14 budget (BTTB 2014/15: 121). Uganda’s recent investment in land tenure security signals modest amounts of national political priority as well as a significant uptick in bureaucratic competency and organization.

Works Cited

Deiniger, Klaus, and Binswanger Hans. “The Evolution of the World Bank’s Land Policy:

Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges.” The World Bank Research Observer 14, no. 2 (1999): 247–276.

Background to the Budget. 2016. Government of Uganda.

Background to the Budget. 2014. Government of Uganda.

Gibb, Ryan. 2013. “The Politics of Land Reform in Uganda”. Lawrence, USA: University of

Kansas.

National Land Policy. 2013. Government of Uganda.

Onoma, Ato Kwamena. The Politics of Property Rights Institutions in Africa. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Ostrom, Elinor, and Harini Nagenda. “Tenure Alone Is Not Sufficient: Monitoring Is 
Essential.”  Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 8 (2007): 175–199.